Spain and themarkets;The Spanish patient

　　西班牙及市場;西班牙患者;

　　A full bail-out of the euro area s fourth-largesteconomy is looming;

　　對歐元區(qū)第四大經(jīng)濟體的全面紓困正在逼近;

　　If Spain were a patient, the mood in the hospitalward would be tense. Every attempt by localspecialists advised by renowned Europeanconsultants to treat the sickness brings no morethan temporary relief. Even more worrying, therelapses after each dose are happening sooner and sooner. Spain s chances of avoidingintensive carea full bail-outare receding to near vanishing-point.

　　如果西班牙是一名患者，那么在醫(yī)院病房里的氣氛是非常緊張的。由歐洲著名顧問建議，并由當?shù)貙＜宜鶎嵤┑臑橹委熂膊∷龅拿總€努力都只帶來了短暫的緩解。更令人擔憂的是，每次服藥后病情的復發(fā)一次比一次提前。如此看來，西班牙想要避免重病特別護理一次全面的紓困的希望開始變得遙不可及。

　　The symptoms of Spanish sickness are manifest in ten-year government bond yieldstouching 7.75% on July 25th; previous bail-outs of Greece, Ireland and Portugal occurrednot long after rates had surpassed 7%. Even more perturbing, two-year yields also brieflywent above 7%, in effect foreclosing the government s ability to borrow at anything but shortmaturities.

　　西班牙的癥狀主要表現(xiàn)為10年期的政府債券收益率在7月25日達到了7.75%;而先前對希臘，愛爾蘭和葡萄牙的的紓困正是在債券收益率超過了7%后不久發(fā)生的。更令人感到不安的是，2年期的收益率也曾在短時期內突破了7%，這就實際上排除了政府有能力發(fā)行長期債券的可能而只能發(fā)行短期債券。

　　No isolation ward is possible in the financially integrated euro area and Spain s sicknessquickly infected other countries. The Italian ten-year bond yield went above 6.5%, itshighest since January. European stockmarkets retreated and Italy s fell to a euro-era low.Sentiment was further soured by a report from Moody s, a ratings agency, saying thatGermany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands might lose their cherished triple-A status. Theprognosis was based in part on fears about the public-debt burden that northern countriesmight have to assume if bail-outs spread.

　　在金融一體化的歐元區(qū)是沒有隔離病房的，于是西班牙的病情很快就感染了其它國家。意大利10年期的債券收益權超過了6.5%，為1月以來最高。歐洲股市回落，意大利股市降到了歐元區(qū)的最低點。一份來自穆迪公司一家評級機構的報告說，德國、盧森堡和荷蘭有可能會失去它們寶貴的AAA評級地位，這就使得股市更加敏感。這種預測部分是根據(jù)人們對于公共債務負擔的恐懼人們擔心一旦紓困蔓延開來，北歐國家可能需要承擔責任。

　　The market funk was the more troubling since a Spanish government with a lot going for ithad appeared to be getting a grip. Public debt is rising fast, but at 69% of GDP last year wasfar lower than Italy s 120%and less even than Germany s 81%. The budget deficit is high, but only a week before the market panic Mariano Rajoy, the primeminister, announced more tough austerity measures. And on July 20th European financeministers sanctioned the first tranche of a partial bail-out worth up to EURO100 billion for Spanish banks.

　　由于仍需努力的西班牙政府似乎開始掌控局面，這種市場恐懼就更令人感到不安了。公共債務快速上升，但去年西班牙公共債務占GDP的69%這一比例遠遠低于意大利的120%甚至還低于德國的81%。預算赤字居高不下，但就在市場恐慌一周前，西班牙總理馬里亞諾.拉霍伊還宣布了更多嚴厲的緊縮措施。7月20日，歐洲財政部長批準為西班牙銀行提供價值1000億歐元的第一批紓困資金。

　　So why are investors in such a cold sweat about Spain? One reason is that Mr Rajoy flunkedhard choices at the outset, notably the cleansing of the banks. Despite a low starting-pointfor public debt, deficit overshoots have revealed insufficient central control over the 17regions that are responsible for a big chunk of spending. Investors fret that more regionsmay follow Valencia, which applied for aid on July 20th. They are in any case sceptical thatSpain can meet its targets for cutting the deficit in the teeth of a recession that is harsherthan expected.

　　那為什么投資者對西班牙市場感到如此惶恐不安?原因之一是拉霍伊總理在一開始的艱難抉擇中就失敗了，尤其是在清理銀行方面。盡管公共債務一開始很低，但赤字的快速上升表明了中央政府對17個地區(qū)的管理不足，這些地區(qū)占據(jù)了支出的很大一部分。巴倫西亞于7月20日申請了救助，而投資者擔心會有更多的地區(qū)跟隨巴倫西亞的步伐。他們懷疑西班牙能否面對超出想象的經(jīng)濟衰退，達成削減赤字的目標。

　　The biggest worry is Spain s external debt. Spain ran hefty current-account deficits in thefirst decade of the euro. As a result, its liabilities to foreign investors exceeded the assetsthat its residents own abroad by 92% of GDP last year, among the highest in the euro area.The problem for Spain is that foreign capital has been fleeing over the past year. That hasweakened the banks and the economy and left the Spanish government shunned by foreigninvestors for its own financing needs.

　　人們最大的擔憂是西班牙的外債。西班牙進入歐元區(qū)的第一個十年就背負了大量的往來賬戶赤字，其結果是去年西班牙的外債超過其居民在國外擁有的資產，其差額相當于GDP 的92%，這位于歐元區(qū)前列。西班牙的問題是在過去的一年中，外國資本在不斷外流，這就使得銀行和經(jīng)濟情況不斷惡化，并使得西班牙政府在融資方面吸引不了外國投資者。

　　The European summit in late June offered a flicker of hope but it is guttering. Euro-arealeaders agreed that the European Stability Mechanism , their new permanent rescuefund, would be able to inject funds directly into banks rather than via loans to thegovernment. That perked markets up since it promised to sever the link between weakbanks and weak sovereigns. But before long the deal looked less solid: the ESM cannot comeinto force until September, when Germany s constitutional court will rule on its legality.Assuming it passes that test, the ESM cannot be used for direct bank recapitalisation until aEuropean supervisor is put in charge.

　　六月底的歐洲峰會為人們帶來了一絲希望，但這個希望卻正在逐漸破滅。歐元區(qū)領導人同意歐洲穩(wěn)定機制 新的永久救助基金，可以直接為各銀行注入資金而無需通過政府。這個消息讓市場振奮不已，因為它承諾斷開脆弱的銀行和脆弱的國家之間的聯(lián)系。但沒過多久這個協(xié)議便看起來不那么可靠：歐洲穩(wěn)定機制直到九月才生效，到時德國憲法法庭會對其合法性進行裁決。即使這個機制通過了考驗，在歐洲監(jiān)督機構成立之前，它依然不能直接用來對銀行進行資金重組。

　　Spain may yet be able to fend off a bail-out for some time. It has some cash reserves andcan still borrow at short maturities. The euro area also has its temporary rescue fund,which will lend the Spanish government the initial sum of money for the banks. But even ifSpain survives a hot summer, the markets are signalling that it will need a full bail-out laterthis year.

　　西班牙可能仍可抵擋紓困計劃一段時間，它還有一些現(xiàn)金并能發(fā)行短期債券。歐元區(qū)也有臨時救助資金，它可以把首批貸款借給西班牙政府以對其銀行進行重組。但即使西班牙能安然度過這個夏天，市場表明其在年底依然需要一次全面紓困。

　　That would be a nightmare, and not just for Spain. The Spanish government must borrowEURO385 billion until the end of 2023 to cover its budget deficit and other needs such asbond redemptions, according to economists at Credit Suisse. Even if the IMF chips in a thirdas in previous bail-outs, European lenders would have to find EURO250 billion or so. Theyhave already committed EURO100 billion to rescuing Spanish banks, so for otheremergencies they would have only EURO150 billion of the EURO500 billion now in theirrescue kitties.

　　這將是一場噩夢，不僅僅對于西班牙來說。瑞士信貸的經(jīng)濟學家們稱，在2023年底之前，西班牙政府必須借入3850億歐元來填補其預算赤字以及滿足其它一些需要，如債務償還。即使國際貨幣基金組織能和之前的紓困中一樣提供三分之一救助資金，歐洲領導人也依然需要籌集2500億歐元左右。他們已經(jīng)承諾用1000億歐元來拯救西班牙銀行，那么一旦出現(xiàn)其它狀況，5000億歐元的救助資金中他們便只剩1500億歐元來應對。

　　The course of events is eerily similar to what happened a year ago. Then European leadersappeared to have secured their summer holidays with a breakthrough summit. But thingssoon fell apart. Nerves about Italy and Spain were calmed only when the European CentralBank started buying their bonds. The central bank was never keen on this and it hasnot been buying bonds for several months. Even if the ECB were to resume purchases theymight be less effective than before, because its refusal to share in the pain of the Greek debtrestructuring in March frightened bondholders elsewhere.

　　事件的發(fā)展過程和去年的極為詭異地相似。歐洲領導人似乎以突破性的峰會保住了他們的暑期，但事情很快又分崩離析。只有在歐洲中央銀行開始購買意大利和西班牙的債券后人們的緊張情緒才得以緩解。中央銀行從未對此如此熱情并且已多月未購買債券。但即使歐洲中央銀行重新開始購買債券，效果也大不如從前了，因為3月份希臘債務進行重組時，歐洲中央銀行拒絕承擔其債務，這讓其它國家的許多債券持有人感到恐慌。

　　The awkward truth is that the Spanish government is not alone in flunking hard choices. Theplight of Spain and the danger of its sickness spreading to Italy call for a decisivecountermove by Germany and the ECB. One being discussed would be to give the ESM abanking licence, which would magnify its resources by allowing it to borrow from the centralbank. The graver the euro crisis gets, the bigger the response has to beand the harder it isto sell to sceptical northern electorates.

　　令人尷尬的事實是，西班牙政府并不是唯一一個在艱難抉擇中不及格的政府，西班牙的困境及病情已擴散到意大利，這就需要德國和歐洲中央銀行采取果斷應對措施。已經(jīng)討論過的措施之一是給歐洲穩(wěn)定機制發(fā)一個銀行執(zhí)照，允許它從中央銀行貸款，從而擴大其資源。歐元危機一旦變得更加嚴重，所需做出的回應也更大 想要說服持懷疑態(tài)度的北歐選民也就更加困難。

　　Spain and themarkets;The Spanish patient

　　西班牙及市場;西班牙患者;

　　A full bail-out of the euro area s fourth-largesteconomy is looming;

　　對歐元區(qū)第四大經(jīng)濟體的全面紓困正在逼近;

　　If Spain were a patient, the mood in the hospitalward would be tense. Every attempt by localspecialists advised by renowned Europeanconsultants to treat the sickness brings no morethan temporary relief. Even more worrying, therelapses after each dose are happening sooner and sooner. Spain s chances of avoidingintensive carea full bail-outare receding to near vanishing-point.

　　如果西班牙是一名患者，那么在醫(yī)院病房里的氣氛是非常緊張的。由歐洲著名顧問建議，并由當?shù)貙＜宜鶎嵤┑臑橹委熂膊∷龅拿總€努力都只帶來了短暫的緩解。更令人擔憂的是，每次服藥后病情的復發(fā)一次比一次提前。如此看來，西班牙想要避免重病特別護理一次全面的紓困的希望開始變得遙不可及。

　　The symptoms of Spanish sickness are manifest in ten-year government bond yieldstouching 7.75% on July 25th; previous bail-outs of Greece, Ireland and Portugal occurrednot long after rates had surpassed 7%. Even more perturbing, two-year yields also brieflywent above 7%, in effect foreclosing the government s ability to borrow at anything but shortmaturities.

　　西班牙的癥狀主要表現(xiàn)為10年期的政府債券收益率在7月25日達到了7.75%;而先前對希臘，愛爾蘭和葡萄牙的的紓困正是在債券收益率超過了7%后不久發(fā)生的。更令人感到不安的是，2年期的收益率也曾在短時期內突破了7%，這就實際上排除了政府有能力發(fā)行長期債券的可能而只能發(fā)行短期債券。

　　No isolation ward is possible in the financially integrated euro area and Spain s sicknessquickly infected other countries. The Italian ten-year bond yield went above 6.5%, itshighest since January. European stockmarkets retreated and Italy s fell to a euro-era low.Sentiment was further soured by a report from Moody s, a ratings agency, saying thatGermany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands might lose their cherished triple-A status. Theprognosis was based in part on fears about the public-debt burden that northern countriesmight have to assume if bail-outs spread.

　　在金融一體化的歐元區(qū)是沒有隔離病房的，于是西班牙的病情很快就感染了其它國家。意大利10年期的債券收益權超過了6.5%，為1月以來最高。歐洲股市回落，意大利股市降到了歐元區(qū)的最低點。一份來自穆迪公司一家評級機構的報告說，德國、盧森堡和荷蘭有可能會失去它們寶貴的AAA評級地位，這就使得股市更加敏感。這種預測部分是根據(jù)人們對于公共債務負擔的恐懼人們擔心一旦紓困蔓延開來，北歐國家可能需要承擔責任。

　　The market funk was the more troubling since a Spanish government with a lot going for ithad appeared to be getting a grip. Public debt is rising fast, but at 69% of GDP last year wasfar lower than Italy s 120%and less even than Germany s 81%. The budget deficit is high, but only a week before the market panic Mariano Rajoy, the primeminister, announced more tough austerity measures. And on July 20th European financeministers sanctioned the first tranche of a partial bail-out worth up to EURO100 billion for Spanish banks.

　　由于仍需努力的西班牙政府似乎開始掌控局面，這種市場恐懼就更令人感到不安了。公共債務快速上升，但去年西班牙公共債務占GDP的69%這一比例遠遠低于意大利的120%甚至還低于德國的81%。預算赤字居高不下，但就在市場恐慌一周前，西班牙總理馬里亞諾.拉霍伊還宣布了更多嚴厲的緊縮措施。7月20日，歐洲財政部長批準為西班牙銀行提供價值1000億歐元的第一批紓困資金。

　　So why are investors in such a cold sweat about Spain? One reason is that Mr Rajoy flunkedhard choices at the outset, notably the cleansing of the banks. Despite a low starting-pointfor public debt, deficit overshoots have revealed insufficient central control over the 17regions that are responsible for a big chunk of spending. Investors fret that more regionsmay follow Valencia, which applied for aid on July 20th. They are in any case sceptical thatSpain can meet its targets for cutting the deficit in the teeth of a recession that is harsherthan expected.

　　那為什么投資者對西班牙市場感到如此惶恐不安?原因之一是拉霍伊總理在一開始的艱難抉擇中就失敗了，尤其是在清理銀行方面。盡管公共債務一開始很低，但赤字的快速上升表明了中央政府對17個地區(qū)的管理不足，這些地區(qū)占據(jù)了支出的很大一部分。巴倫西亞于7月20日申請了救助，而投資者擔心會有更多的地區(qū)跟隨巴倫西亞的步伐。他們懷疑西班牙能否面對超出想象的經(jīng)濟衰退，達成削減赤字的目標。

　　The biggest worry is Spain s external debt. Spain ran hefty current-account deficits in thefirst decade of the euro. As a result, its liabilities to foreign investors exceeded the assetsthat its residents own abroad by 92% of GDP last year, among the highest in the euro area.The problem for Spain is that foreign capital has been fleeing over the past year. That hasweakened the banks and the economy and left the Spanish government shunned by foreigninvestors for its own financing needs.

　　人們最大的擔憂是西班牙的外債。西班牙進入歐元區(qū)的第一個十年就背負了大量的往來賬戶赤字，其結果是去年西班牙的外債超過其居民在國外擁有的資產，其差額相當于GDP 的92%，這位于歐元區(qū)前列。西班牙的問題是在過去的一年中，外國資本在不斷外流，這就使得銀行和經(jīng)濟情況不斷惡化，并使得西班牙政府在融資方面吸引不了外國投資者。

　　The European summit in late June offered a flicker of hope but it is guttering. Euro-arealeaders agreed that the European Stability Mechanism , their new permanent rescuefund, would be able to inject funds directly into banks rather than via loans to thegovernment. That perked markets up since it promised to sever the link between weakbanks and weak sovereigns. But before long the deal looked less solid: the ESM cannot comeinto force until September, when Germany s constitutional court will rule on its legality.Assuming it passes that test, the ESM cannot be used for direct bank recapitalisation until aEuropean supervisor is put in charge.

　　六月底的歐洲峰會為人們帶來了一絲希望，但這個希望卻正在逐漸破滅。歐元區(qū)領導人同意歐洲穩(wěn)定機制 新的永久救助基金，可以直接為各銀行注入資金而無需通過政府。這個消息讓市場振奮不已，因為它承諾斷開脆弱的銀行和脆弱的國家之間的聯(lián)系。但沒過多久這個協(xié)議便看起來不那么可靠：歐洲穩(wěn)定機制直到九月才生效，到時德國憲法法庭會對其合法性進行裁決。即使這個機制通過了考驗，在歐洲監(jiān)督機構成立之前，它依然不能直接用來對銀行進行資金重組。

　　Spain may yet be able to fend off a bail-out for some time. It has some cash reserves andcan still borrow at short maturities. The euro area also has its temporary rescue fund,which will lend the Spanish government the initial sum of money for the banks. But even ifSpain survives a hot summer, the markets are signalling that it will need a full bail-out laterthis year.

　　西班牙可能仍可抵擋紓困計劃一段時間，它還有一些現(xiàn)金并能發(fā)行短期債券。歐元區(qū)也有臨時救助資金，它可以把首批貸款借給西班牙政府以對其銀行進行重組。但即使西班牙能安然度過這個夏天，市場表明其在年底依然需要一次全面紓困。

　　That would be a nightmare, and not just for Spain. The Spanish government must borrowEURO385 billion until the end of 2023 to cover its budget deficit and other needs such asbond redemptions, according to economists at Credit Suisse. Even if the IMF chips in a thirdas in previous bail-outs, European lenders would have to find EURO250 billion or so. Theyhave already committed EURO100 billion to rescuing Spanish banks, so for otheremergencies they would have only EURO150 billion of the EURO500 billion now in theirrescue kitties.

　　這將是一場噩夢，不僅僅對于西班牙來說。瑞士信貸的經(jīng)濟學家們稱，在2023年底之前，西班牙政府必須借入3850億歐元來填補其預算赤字以及滿足其它一些需要，如債務償還。即使國際貨幣基金組織能和之前的紓困中一樣提供三分之一救助資金，歐洲領導人也依然需要籌集2500億歐元左右。他們已經(jīng)承諾用1000億歐元來拯救西班牙銀行，那么一旦出現(xiàn)其它狀況，5000億歐元的救助資金中他們便只剩1500億歐元來應對。

　　The course of events is eerily similar to what happened a year ago. Then European leadersappeared to have secured their summer holidays with a breakthrough summit. But thingssoon fell apart. Nerves about Italy and Spain were calmed only when the European CentralBank started buying their bonds. The central bank was never keen on this and it hasnot been buying bonds for several months. Even if the ECB were to resume purchases theymight be less effective than before, because its refusal to share in the pain of the Greek debtrestructuring in March frightened bondholders elsewhere.

　　事件的發(fā)展過程和去年的極為詭異地相似。歐洲領導人似乎以突破性的峰會保住了他們的暑期，但事情很快又分崩離析。只有在歐洲中央銀行開始購買意大利和西班牙的債券后人們的緊張情緒才得以緩解。中央銀行從未對此如此熱情并且已多月未購買債券。但即使歐洲中央銀行重新開始購買債券，效果也大不如從前了，因為3月份希臘債務進行重組時，歐洲中央銀行拒絕承擔其債務，這讓其它國家的許多債券持有人感到恐慌。

　　The awkward truth is that the Spanish government is not alone in flunking hard choices. Theplight of Spain and the danger of its sickness spreading to Italy call for a decisivecountermove by Germany and the ECB. One being discussed would be to give the ESM abanking licence, which would magnify its resources by allowing it to borrow from the centralbank. The graver the euro crisis gets, the bigger the response has to beand the harder it isto sell to sceptical northern electorates.

　　令人尷尬的事實是，西班牙政府并不是唯一一個在艱難抉擇中不及格的政府，西班牙的困境及病情已擴散到意大利，這就需要德國和歐洲中央銀行采取果斷應對措施。已經(jīng)討論過的措施之一是給歐洲穩(wěn)定機制發(fā)一個銀行執(zhí)照，允許它從中央銀行貸款，從而擴大其資源。歐元危機一旦變得更加嚴重，所需做出的回應也更大 想要說服持懷疑態(tài)度的北歐選民也就更加困難。