美國新總統(tǒng)將要面臨的經(jīng)濟形勢
In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man rules.
盲人國度，獨眼為王。
The US economy shows significant flaws.
雖然美國經(jīng)濟暴露出巨大缺陷，
But it is a king when compared with its peers.
但與其他經(jīng)濟體相比，美國仍可稱王。
It has recovered from the Great Recession, with unemployment low and real incomes rising.
美國經(jīng)濟已從大衰退(Great Recession)中復(fù)蘇，失業(yè)率處于較低水平，實際收入不斷增長。
It also possesses abiding supremacy in new technologies.
美國還在新技術(shù)領(lǐng)域擁有根深蒂固的優(yōu)勢。
Nevertheless, the next administration will take over a country with mediocre growth of productivity, high inequality, a growing retreat from work and a declining rate of creation of new businesses and jobs.
然而，新一屆美國政府將接管的是這樣一個國度：生產(chǎn)率增長差強人意，社會不平等程度高，越來越多人放棄求職，新企業(yè)創(chuàng)立及就業(yè)新增的速度不斷下降。
At least the US fiscal position is not a really urgent threat.
至少美國的財政狀況還并非真正緊迫的威脅。
That is to the good, since nothing much is likely to be done about it.
這是件好事，因為對于財政問題，反正也不太可能做什么。
The financial crisis of 2007-09 was a devastating event, economically and politically.
2007-09年金融危機就經(jīng)濟和政治而言都是一場災(zāi)難。
But real gross domestic product per head had reached its trough by the second quarter of 2009 and recovered to pre-crisis levels by the final quarter of 2024.
但實際人均國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)已在2009年第二季度見底，并于2024年第四季度恢復(fù)至危機前水平。
Similarly, the unemployment rate peaked at 10 per cent in October 2009 but is now back to 4.9 per cent.
類似地，2009年10月，失業(yè)率升至10%的峰值，但現(xiàn)在已回落至4.9%。
The financial sector is also in far better health than during the crisis.
金融業(yè)的健康狀況也已比危機期間好得多。
Too many casual observers take this rapid turnround for granted.
太多漫不經(jīng)心的觀察人士將這種快速的復(fù)蘇視為理所當(dāng)然。
But the Great Recession could have been another Great Depression.
但此次大衰退本來有可能演變成另一場大蕭條(Great Depression)。
It took bold action by the Federal Reserve, the administration of George W Bush and that of Barack Obama to turn the economy around so quickly.
得益于美聯(lián)儲(Fed)、小布什(George W Bush)及巴拉克.奧巴馬(Barack Obama)政府采取的果敢行動，美國經(jīng)濟才如此迅速地恢復(fù)了生機。
Everyone has benefited greatly from this success.
所有人都極大地受益于此次成功。
Nevertheless, the crisis has left deep scars.
然而，這場危機還是留下了嚴(yán)重的后遺癥。
In the second quarter of 2024, real GDP per head was still only 4 per cent above its pre-crisis peak, almost nine years before.
2024年第二季度的實際人均GDP仍只比危機前（將近9年前）的峰值水平高4%。
Labour productivity has grown slowly since the crisis, by historical standards, largely as a result of weakened investment.
以歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)衡量，勞動生產(chǎn)率自上次危機發(fā)生以來一直增長緩慢——主要是由投資減弱造成。
One study estimates US potential output is 7 per cent below levels suggested by pre-crisis trends.
一項研究估計，美國的潛在產(chǎn)出比危機前的趨勢水平低了7%。
Yet average growth of US labour productivity, albeit slowly subsiding, has exceeded that of other leading high-income economies over the past 15 years.
但盡管出現(xiàn)放緩，過去15年間，美國勞動生產(chǎn)率的平均增速超過了其他主要高收入經(jīng)濟體。
This is probably due to its dominance of high-tech innovation: the aggregate capitalisation of the five largest US technology companies is now over $2.2tn.
這多半得益于美國在高科技創(chuàng)新領(lǐng)域的主導(dǎo)地位：美國最大的5家科技公司現(xiàn)在的總市值已經(jīng)超過2.2萬億美元。
Yet, the scars left by the crisis, which include diminished confidence in the probity and competence of the financial, intellectual and policymaking elites, also came on top of older ones.
然而，上次危機留下的后遺癥——其中包括對金融界、知識界及政策制定界精英的誠信和能力的日漸不信任——也是緊隨著一些老問題出現(xiàn)的。
Real median household income increased by 5.2 per cent between 2024 and 2024.
2024年至2024年間，美國家庭實際收入中值提高了5.2%.
But it remains below pre-crisis levels.
但仍低于危機前的水平。
Indeed, it is below levels reached in 2000 and has even fallen relative to real GDP per head consistently since the mid 1970s.
實際上，這一中值也低于2000年水平，甚至相對于自上世紀(jì)70年代中期以來的實際人均GDP都一直在下降。
This performance helps explain the tide of disillusionment, even despair, revealed so starkly by this grim election (see charts).
這一表現(xiàn)可以解釋普遍的幻滅感，甚至絕望感——在此次氣氛嚴(yán)肅的大選中顯露無遺 。
Not surprisingly, inequality has worsened markedly.
意料之中的是，美國的不平等已明顯惡化。
Between 1980 and the most recent period, the share of the top 1 per cent in pre-tax income jumped from 10 per cent to 18 per cent.
從1980年直至最近時期，稅前收入前1%人口所占收入比例已從10%躍升至18%。
Even after tax, it rose by a third, from 8 to 12 per cent.
即使是稅后，他們所占收入比例也增加了三分之一，從8%增至12%。
The rise in compensation of chief executives, relative to that of workers, has been huge.
相對于普通員工，首席執(zhí)行官們的薪酬漲幅一直很高。
The US has the highest inequality of any high-income country and has seen the fastest rise in inequality among the seven leading high-income economies.
在所有高收入國家中，美國的不平等程度最高，而在7個收入最高的經(jīng)濟體中，美國不平等程度加劇的速度最快。
The divergence among these countries suggests that rising inequality is far more a social choice than an economic imperative.
這些國家之間的差異表明，不平等程度日益加劇更多的是一個社會選擇問題，而非在經(jīng)濟上不可避免。
Closely related to the rising inequality has been a decline in the share of labour in GDP from 64.6 per cent in 2001 to 60.4 per cent in 2024.
與日益加劇的不平等密切相關(guān)的是，勞動力在GDP中所占份額從2001年的64.6%下降到2024年的60.4%。
Workers have not only suffered from declining shares of the pie.
勞動者遭遇的不僅是分到的蛋糕越來越小。
Just as significant is the steady rise in the proportion of men aged 25 to 54 neither in work nor seeking it from about 3 per cent in the 1950s to 12 per cent now.
同樣顯著的遭遇還有，25歲至54歲男性中沒有工作且已放棄求職的比例穩(wěn)步上升，從20世紀(jì)50年代的3%上升到現(xiàn)在的12%。
Even France had a higher fraction of prime-age men in jobs than the US every year since 2001.
就連法國的壯年男性占就業(yè)人口比例自2001年以來都年年壓過美國。
Since 1990, the US has had the second-largest increase in male non-participation in the labour force of all members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
自1990年起，美國男性未參與勞動的比率的增幅在經(jīng)合組織(OECD)所有成員國里排第二。
After 2000, the declining trend in non-participation of prime-age women also halted.
2000年以后，壯年女性未參與勞動的比率不斷下降的趨勢也停止了。
The proportion of US women in this age category in employment is now among the lowest of all the members of the OECD.
美國女性在所有壯年就業(yè)人口中所占比例現(xiàn)在也屬經(jīng)合組織所有成員中最低之列。
No less disturbing is a decline in economic dynamism.
經(jīng)濟活力的下降也同樣令人不安。
The rate of creation of new jobs has slowed markedly, as have rates of internal migration.
就業(yè)崗位新增速度顯著放緩，國內(nèi)人口遷移率也是一樣。
The rate of entry of new businesses into the marketplace has also been falling over an extended period, as has the share of ones less than five years old in both the total number of businesses and employment.
新企業(yè)進(jìn)入市場的速度也已持續(xù)下降較長一段時期，成立不足5年的企業(yè)在所有企業(yè)中所占比例以及在總就業(yè)中所占比例也是一樣。
Meanwhile, business fixed investment has been persistently weak.
與此同時，企業(yè)固定投資持續(xù)疲軟。
Evidence also suggests a rising variation in returns on capital.
證據(jù)還顯示資本回報的差異日益加大。
These are long-term trends, not just post-crisis events.
這些都是長期趨勢，不僅僅是危機后事件。
This loss of dynamism may not only be related to declining productivity growth but also to the shifts in income distribution.
經(jīng)濟活力喪失可能不止與生產(chǎn)率增長減弱有關(guān)，還與收入分配的變化有關(guān)。
If competitive pressure is falling, monopolistic and monopsonistic — sole-buyer — positions will either emerge or strengthen.
如果競爭壓力在下降，壟斷和獨買（買方壟斷）的格局要么會出現(xiàn)、要么會鞏固。
The collapse of trade unionism and decline in relative minimum wages reinforce the asymmetric power of business and labour in the marketplace.
工會的崩潰，以及相對最低工資的下降加強了企業(yè)和勞動力在市場中的力量不對稱。
Intellectual property rights can also be a big barrier to competition.
知識產(chǎn)權(quán)也可能成為阻礙競爭的一大因素。
The rise of new regulatory barriers is disturbing.
新監(jiān)管壁壘的興起令人不安。
Among the striking changes is the soaring share of workers with an occupational licence at state level.
還有一個顯著變化是擁有州級職業(yè)許可證的勞動者所占比例出現(xiàn)飆升。
These licences must be a big obstacle to easy movement across state borders.
這些許可證肯定極大地阻礙勞動者方便地跨州流動。
For all its strengths, the US economy could do better.
盡管美國經(jīng)濟擁有種種優(yōu)勢，它本還可以表現(xiàn)得更好。
In addition to the trends identified above, deteriorating infrastructure, worsening relative educational performance and a terrible tax code are challenges.
除上述趨勢以外，基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的退化，教育相對表現(xiàn)的惡化，以及糟糕的稅制都構(gòu)成挑戰(zhàn)。
Halting immigrants and imports would be an act of self-harm.
停止接納移民和進(jìn)口將是自損之舉。
The US must build on its historic strengths of an open and dynamic economy, together with government provision of infrastructure, research, education, and balanced tax and regulatory policies.
美國必須發(fā)揚其一貫的優(yōu)勢，即一個開放、有活力的經(jīng)濟，再加上政府提供的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、研究、教育，以及均衡的稅收和監(jiān)管政策。
A new administration needs the right diagnosis and co-operation from Congress.
新政府需要正確的判斷以及國會的合作。
Pigs may also fly.
豬或許也可以飛起來。
In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man rules.
盲人國度，獨眼為王。
The US economy shows significant flaws.
雖然美國經(jīng)濟暴露出巨大缺陷，
But it is a king when compared with its peers.
但與其他經(jīng)濟體相比，美國仍可稱王。
It has recovered from the Great Recession, with unemployment low and real incomes rising.
美國經(jīng)濟已從大衰退(Great Recession)中復(fù)蘇，失業(yè)率處于較低水平，實際收入不斷增長。
It also possesses abiding supremacy in new technologies.
美國還在新技術(shù)領(lǐng)域擁有根深蒂固的優(yōu)勢。
Nevertheless, the next administration will take over a country with mediocre growth of productivity, high inequality, a growing retreat from work and a declining rate of creation of new businesses and jobs.
然而，新一屆美國政府將接管的是這樣一個國度：生產(chǎn)率增長差強人意，社會不平等程度高，越來越多人放棄求職，新企業(yè)創(chuàng)立及就業(yè)新增的速度不斷下降。
At least the US fiscal position is not a really urgent threat.
至少美國的財政狀況還并非真正緊迫的威脅。
That is to the good, since nothing much is likely to be done about it.
這是件好事，因為對于財政問題，反正也不太可能做什么。
The financial crisis of 2007-09 was a devastating event, economically and politically.
2007-09年金融危機就經(jīng)濟和政治而言都是一場災(zāi)難。
But real gross domestic product per head had reached its trough by the second quarter of 2009 and recovered to pre-crisis levels by the final quarter of 2024.
但實際人均國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)已在2009年第二季度見底，并于2024年第四季度恢復(fù)至危機前水平。
Similarly, the unemployment rate peaked at 10 per cent in October 2009 but is now back to 4.9 per cent.
類似地，2009年10月，失業(yè)率升至10%的峰值，但現(xiàn)在已回落至4.9%。
The financial sector is also in far better health than during the crisis.
金融業(yè)的健康狀況也已比危機期間好得多。
Too many casual observers take this rapid turnround for granted.
太多漫不經(jīng)心的觀察人士將這種快速的復(fù)蘇視為理所當(dāng)然。
But the Great Recession could have been another Great Depression.
但此次大衰退本來有可能演變成另一場大蕭條(Great Depression)。
It took bold action by the Federal Reserve, the administration of George W Bush and that of Barack Obama to turn the economy around so quickly.
得益于美聯(lián)儲(Fed)、小布什(George W Bush)及巴拉克.奧巴馬(Barack Obama)政府采取的果敢行動，美國經(jīng)濟才如此迅速地恢復(fù)了生機。
Everyone has benefited greatly from this success.
所有人都極大地受益于此次成功。
Nevertheless, the crisis has left deep scars.
然而，這場危機還是留下了嚴(yán)重的后遺癥。
In the second quarter of 2024, real GDP per head was still only 4 per cent above its pre-crisis peak, almost nine years before.
2024年第二季度的實際人均GDP仍只比危機前（將近9年前）的峰值水平高4%。
Labour productivity has grown slowly since the crisis, by historical standards, largely as a result of weakened investment.
以歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)衡量，勞動生產(chǎn)率自上次危機發(fā)生以來一直增長緩慢——主要是由投資減弱造成。
One study estimates US potential output is 7 per cent below levels suggested by pre-crisis trends.
一項研究估計，美國的潛在產(chǎn)出比危機前的趨勢水平低了7%。
Yet average growth of US labour productivity, albeit slowly subsiding, has exceeded that of other leading high-income economies over the past 15 years.
但盡管出現(xiàn)放緩，過去15年間，美國勞動生產(chǎn)率的平均增速超過了其他主要高收入經(jīng)濟體。
This is probably due to its dominance of high-tech innovation: the aggregate capitalisation of the five largest US technology companies is now over $2.2tn.
這多半得益于美國在高科技創(chuàng)新領(lǐng)域的主導(dǎo)地位：美國最大的5家科技公司現(xiàn)在的總市值已經(jīng)超過2.2萬億美元。
Yet, the scars left by the crisis, which include diminished confidence in the probity and competence of the financial, intellectual and policymaking elites, also came on top of older ones.
然而，上次危機留下的后遺癥——其中包括對金融界、知識界及政策制定界精英的誠信和能力的日漸不信任——也是緊隨著一些老問題出現(xiàn)的。
Real median household income increased by 5.2 per cent between 2024 and 2024.
2024年至2024年間，美國家庭實際收入中值提高了5.2%.
But it remains below pre-crisis levels.
但仍低于危機前的水平。
Indeed, it is below levels reached in 2000 and has even fallen relative to real GDP per head consistently since the mid 1970s.
實際上，這一中值也低于2000年水平，甚至相對于自上世紀(jì)70年代中期以來的實際人均GDP都一直在下降。
This performance helps explain the tide of disillusionment, even despair, revealed so starkly by this grim election (see charts).
這一表現(xiàn)可以解釋普遍的幻滅感，甚至絕望感——在此次氣氛嚴(yán)肅的大選中顯露無遺 。
Not surprisingly, inequality has worsened markedly.
意料之中的是，美國的不平等已明顯惡化。
Between 1980 and the most recent period, the share of the top 1 per cent in pre-tax income jumped from 10 per cent to 18 per cent.
從1980年直至最近時期，稅前收入前1%人口所占收入比例已從10%躍升至18%。
Even after tax, it rose by a third, from 8 to 12 per cent.
即使是稅后，他們所占收入比例也增加了三分之一，從8%增至12%。
The rise in compensation of chief executives, relative to that of workers, has been huge.
相對于普通員工，首席執(zhí)行官們的薪酬漲幅一直很高。
The US has the highest inequality of any high-income country and has seen the fastest rise in inequality among the seven leading high-income economies.
在所有高收入國家中，美國的不平等程度最高，而在7個收入最高的經(jīng)濟體中，美國不平等程度加劇的速度最快。
The divergence among these countries suggests that rising inequality is far more a social choice than an economic imperative.
這些國家之間的差異表明，不平等程度日益加劇更多的是一個社會選擇問題，而非在經(jīng)濟上不可避免。
Closely related to the rising inequality has been a decline in the share of labour in GDP from 64.6 per cent in 2001 to 60.4 per cent in 2024.
與日益加劇的不平等密切相關(guān)的是，勞動力在GDP中所占份額從2001年的64.6%下降到2024年的60.4%。
Workers have not only suffered from declining shares of the pie.
勞動者遭遇的不僅是分到的蛋糕越來越小。
Just as significant is the steady rise in the proportion of men aged 25 to 54 neither in work nor seeking it from about 3 per cent in the 1950s to 12 per cent now.
同樣顯著的遭遇還有，25歲至54歲男性中沒有工作且已放棄求職的比例穩(wěn)步上升，從20世紀(jì)50年代的3%上升到現(xiàn)在的12%。
Even France had a higher fraction of prime-age men in jobs than the US every year since 2001.
就連法國的壯年男性占就業(yè)人口比例自2001年以來都年年壓過美國。
Since 1990, the US has had the second-largest increase in male non-participation in the labour force of all members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
自1990年起，美國男性未參與勞動的比率的增幅在經(jīng)合組織(OECD)所有成員國里排第二。
After 2000, the declining trend in non-participation of prime-age women also halted.
2000年以后，壯年女性未參與勞動的比率不斷下降的趨勢也停止了。
The proportion of US women in this age category in employment is now among the lowest of all the members of the OECD.
美國女性在所有壯年就業(yè)人口中所占比例現(xiàn)在也屬經(jīng)合組織所有成員中最低之列。
No less disturbing is a decline in economic dynamism.
經(jīng)濟活力的下降也同樣令人不安。
The rate of creation of new jobs has slowed markedly, as have rates of internal migration.
就業(yè)崗位新增速度顯著放緩，國內(nèi)人口遷移率也是一樣。
The rate of entry of new businesses into the marketplace has also been falling over an extended period, as has the share of ones less than five years old in both the total number of businesses and employment.
新企業(yè)進(jìn)入市場的速度也已持續(xù)下降較長一段時期，成立不足5年的企業(yè)在所有企業(yè)中所占比例以及在總就業(yè)中所占比例也是一樣。
Meanwhile, business fixed investment has been persistently weak.
與此同時，企業(yè)固定投資持續(xù)疲軟。
Evidence also suggests a rising variation in returns on capital.
證據(jù)還顯示資本回報的差異日益加大。
These are long-term trends, not just post-crisis events.
這些都是長期趨勢，不僅僅是危機后事件。
This loss of dynamism may not only be related to declining productivity growth but also to the shifts in income distribution.
經(jīng)濟活力喪失可能不止與生產(chǎn)率增長減弱有關(guān)，還與收入分配的變化有關(guān)。
If competitive pressure is falling, monopolistic and monopsonistic — sole-buyer — positions will either emerge or strengthen.
如果競爭壓力在下降，壟斷和獨買（買方壟斷）的格局要么會出現(xiàn)、要么會鞏固。
The collapse of trade unionism and decline in relative minimum wages reinforce the asymmetric power of business and labour in the marketplace.
工會的崩潰，以及相對最低工資的下降加強了企業(yè)和勞動力在市場中的力量不對稱。
Intellectual property rights can also be a big barrier to competition.
知識產(chǎn)權(quán)也可能成為阻礙競爭的一大因素。
The rise of new regulatory barriers is disturbing.
新監(jiān)管壁壘的興起令人不安。
Among the striking changes is the soaring share of workers with an occupational licence at state level.
還有一個顯著變化是擁有州級職業(yè)許可證的勞動者所占比例出現(xiàn)飆升。
These licences must be a big obstacle to easy movement across state borders.
這些許可證肯定極大地阻礙勞動者方便地跨州流動。
For all its strengths, the US economy could do better.
盡管美國經(jīng)濟擁有種種優(yōu)勢，它本還可以表現(xiàn)得更好。
In addition to the trends identified above, deteriorating infrastructure, worsening relative educational performance and a terrible tax code are challenges.
除上述趨勢以外，基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的退化，教育相對表現(xiàn)的惡化，以及糟糕的稅制都構(gòu)成挑戰(zhàn)。
Halting immigrants and imports would be an act of self-harm.
停止接納移民和進(jìn)口將是自損之舉。
The US must build on its historic strengths of an open and dynamic economy, together with government provision of infrastructure, research, education, and balanced tax and regulatory policies.
美國必須發(fā)揚其一貫的優(yōu)勢，即一個開放、有活力的經(jīng)濟，再加上政府提供的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、研究、教育，以及均衡的稅收和監(jiān)管政策。
A new administration needs the right diagnosis and co-operation from Congress.
新政府需要正確的判斷以及國會的合作。
Pigs may also fly.
豬或許也可以飛起來。
